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WHAT MAKES US DIFFERENT?
Peter Fleming Jr. *
For reasons I have yet to discover, I am a trial lawyer and
have been one for over thirty years. I have tried civil cases on both
sides. I was a federal prosecutor for nine years and have defended
numerous criminal cases. Against this experience, the subject of
this Symposium strikes me as both odd and disturbing. As far as I
am concerned, "The Responsibility of the Criminal Defense At-
torney" differs not one whit from the responsibility of any trial
lawyer in any case. In sum, the nature of the case, civil or criminal,
bears not at all on the responsibilities of the attorney as trial coun-
sel and as an officer of the court.
As in any trial representation, a criminal defense counsel's re-
sponsibility, and first obligation, is to the client. As criminal de-
fense attorneys, we owe our hard work, our diligence, our passion,
and the best of our skills and judgment to our clients. We must do
our best to convey a belief that justice may be found within a sys-
tem that does not always appear to be just and that too often is
not. We owe compassion, empathy, and a sense of understanding
to a human being caught up in a new world that a layperson cannot
possibly fathom. We owe an unflagging belief in our client's inno-
cence or, at the least, in reasonable doubt. And where neither is
possible, we owe the best possible solution short of trial. Simply
put, as in any kind of case, the criminal defense counsel, like any
other counsel, owes the client the greatest chance to win or, if this
is not possible, an honest judgment.
But our responsibilities do not end with our clients. We owe
respect and candor to the court and an honest effort on matters of
law. And when they deserve it, we owe respect and courtesy to the
prosecutors. Lastly, we owe just about everything to the jury, but
we owe two things principally: to be fair and square with the evi-
dence and to drive home to each juror that "not proved" means
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"not guilty." Our role, in large part, is the role of teacher. We fail
in our representation unless, as the trial progresses, the jury looks
to us as the source of information and enlightenment. In a real
sense, we must become partners with a jury that is faced with the
ultimate duty of a just verdict.
What may surprise the public, but what I am convinced is true,
is that fulfilling these obligations has substantive impact. Profes-
sionalism is an essential part of persuasion and has many beneficial
impacts on a case; tricks don't work. First, the client who senses
true empathy and understanding and believes that justice is possi-
ble is more comfortable, more durable, and, if called, a better wit-
ness. Second, the court that comes to trust an attorney will at least
listen and ponder, regardless of its final ruling. And lastly, a jury,
treated with respect and candor, is more likely to find in your fa-
vor.
If I am right that these ideas are equally relevant in defending
a civil case, why is the question of professional responsibility lim-
ited here to criminal defense attorneys? Are we different? Are
we suspect? In a country with roots in a revolution against the
abuse of power and with a concrete, actively enforced Bill of
Rights, why must it be true that the defense of a criminal case and,
by implication, the Bill of Rights is increasingly viewed as a kind of
game?
Surely, there are many reasons for this perception, including
the public feeling that crime is on the rise, that indictment means
guilt, and that "technicalities" obstruct justice. This said, I suspect
there is one particular reason for the focus of this Symposium, for
it is the Simpson case that gives timeliness to the question posed.
Why should this be? What I saw in Simpson was: (1) a group of
skilled professionals who drilled holes in the prosecution's case
and its witnesses; (2) a trial judge who, in difficult circumstances,
did his best to be fair; (3) an overconfident prosecutor's office that
rushed to judgment; and (4) a conscientious jury of decent men
and women who endured sequestration and, right or wrong, found
reasonable doubt.
I suggest the reaction to the Simpson verdict stems not from
the trial itself but from its coverage. To steal from James Carville:
"It's the commentary, stupid."'
1. "Carville is the campaign strategist who helped Clinton to victory and coined
the term 'It's the economy stupid' to explain it all." James Bates, Footnotes: Words
from a Ragin' Cajun, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1993, at D1.
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What did we hear?
"Dream Team."
"Race card."
"Judge Ito's lost control."
"Reasonable doubt is an extremely tough standard."
What we did not hear was, "Hey, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is what America is all about."
Viewed in this context, the question posed by this Symposium
deserves an answer that goes beyond mere trial practice. Our re-
sponsibility as criminal defense counsel includes the responsibility
to stand our ground. We must remember that defending an ac-
cused is part of defending an essential and basic philosophy of lib-
erty, which others seem to have forgotten. Our government is not
always right. Indictment does not mean guilt. Agendas do exist.
Power can be abused. This is what the Founders understood.
Hence, when the government decides to charge and indict a de-
fendant, it has the obligation to prove its case-not by evidence
that raises suspicion and invites speculation-but by evidence that
proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is a simple idea, but
nonetheless remains a basic principle of freedom: "not proved"
means "not guilty."
So, in the end, and in perspective, I was wrong. As criminal
defense attorneys, we do carry a burden or responsibility that does
make us different from defense attorneys in civil cases. We do not
represent the accused simply because the accused deserve a de-
fense. We represent the accused to keep the government at bay, to
do everything in our power to limit the possibility of an abuse of
power, and to do everything we can to make the system work.
And, while I can hear the chuckling in the corridors, carrying out
that responsibility is our public service.
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